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The Hague Judgments Convention in the United States:
A “Game Changer” or a New Path to the Old Game?
Ronald A. Brand*

Abstract
The Hague Judgments Convention, completed on July 2, 2019, is built
on a list of “jurisdictional filters” in Article 5(1), and grounds for nonrecognition in Article 7. If one of the thirteen jurisdictional tests in Article
5(1) is satisfied, the judgment may circulate under the Convention, subject
to the grounds for non-recognition found in Article 7. This approach to
Convention structure is especially significant for countries considering
ratification and implementation. A different structure was suggested in the
initial Working Group stage of the Convention’s preparation which would
have avoided the complexity of multiple rules of indirect jurisdiction, each
of which comes with its own complexity and risk for non-uniform
interpretation. That alternative structure, however, may in fact be possible
under the current Convention text, using Article 15 as a work-around.
Article 15 allows the recognition or enforcement of judgments under
national law. For countries like the United States, with very liberal existing
law on the recognition of foreign judgments, Article 15 may in fact provide
a more efficient, effective, and economical approach, even under the
Convention. This article considers the benefits and risks of the complex
Convention structure which was chosen, as well as the alternative
Convention architecture that was left behind in the negotiation process. It
then suggests that the path through Article 15 may well offer a valuable
alternative in the implementation and operation of the Convention in
countries with existing liberal and non-discriminatory approaches to
judgments recognition.
*
Chancellor Mark A. Nordenberg University Professor, John E. Murray
Scholar, and Director, Center for International Legal Education, University of
Pittsburgh School of Law. The author was a member of the U.S. delegation to the
Judgments Project negotiations at the Hague Conference on Private International
Law in both the Working Group and the Special Commissions prior to the May
2018 Special Commission and has participated in numerous conferences
concerning the Hague Judgments Project. The statements in this article are those of
the author alone, made in his personal capacity, and should in no way be taken to
reflect the position of the United States in the negotiations. The author thanks Peter
Trooboff for useful comments on a prior draft. The article was posted in an earlier
version on SSRN at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3334647.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2019 Hague Judgments Convention is the culmination of over a
quarter century of negotiations at the Hague Conference on Private
International Law.1 Those negotiations began in 1992, when the United
States requested that a global approach to jurisdiction and judgments
recognition be placed on the Hague Conference agenda.2 Along the way to
the 2019 Convention, the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements was completed, and is now in effect in Mexico, Montenegro,
Singapore, the United Kingdom,3 and the Member States of the European
Union.4 This placed the world on the way to the goal of global recognition
and enforcement of judgments in cases arising from commercial contracts
with exclusive choice of court agreements. As the Final Text of the
Judgments Convention was signed on July 2, 2019 by those who
participated in the negotiations, the Secretary General of the Hague
Conference spoke of the Convention as a “game changer” in international
litigation.
The new Judgments Convention is based largely on what some have
referred to as “jurisdictional filters.” Article 5(1) of the Convention
provides a list of thirteen authorized bases of indirect jurisdiction by which
a foreign judgment is first tested. If one of these jurisdictional filters is
satisfied, the resulting judgment is presumptively entitled to circulate under

1

Hague Conference on Private International Law, 2019 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters
(Judgments
Convention),
available
at
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=137.
2

The discussion of judgments recognition at the Hague Conference began
much earlier with a Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters completed in 1971, but never entering into effect.
See, RONALD A. BRAND AND PAUL M. HERRUP, THE 2005 HAGUE CONVENTION ON
CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS, ch. 1 (Cambridge University Press 2008).
3
On December 28, 2018, the United Kingdom filed an instrument accepting
the Convention should its withdrawal from the European Union become effective
in
March
2019.
See
status
table
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98.
4
Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements,
available at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/specialised-sections/choice-ofcourt.
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the Convention,5 subject to an Article 7 set of grounds for non-recognition
that generally are consistent with existing practice in most legal systems.6
This operational structure of the Judgments Convention – its
“architecture” – is important to states that will consider ratification and
accession, and of particular importance to the United States. Once the
discussions at The Hague moved from Working Group to Special
Commission process, however, it was a matter of only limited discussion.
The Working Group draft that became the focus of the work of Special
Commissions and the Diplomatic Conference represented a very specific
choice in this regard, and the matter of convention architecture was
considered to have been settled at the outset, with no real opportunity for
reconsideration.
For the United States, consideration of ratification of the Judgments
Convention must take into account existing U.S. law on judgments
recognition, which is more closely aligned to an alternative approach that
was not followed in the Working Group or the subsequent negotiating
sessions. That does not, however, prevent the 2019 Judgments Convention
from being attractive from a U.S. perspective. The Convention has clear
benefits to the United States in the recognition and enforcement of U.S.
judgments abroad. The Convention architecture does, however, have
important implications for the implementation and use of the Convention
should the United States ratify the Convention.
In this article, I begin with a review of the history of the Hague
Judgments Project in order to provide the context for the decisions that
were made in reaching the 2019 Judgments Convention text. I then give
particular attention to Article 5(1) of the Convention, the manner in which
it is constructed, and the alternative convention architecture that could have
been chosen. Using this background, I next consider why, in the United
States (as well as in a number of other states without a “jurisdiction gap”
between direct and indirect jurisdiction rules), the operation of the
Convention may be determined less by the Article 5(1) list of indirect bases
of jurisdiction than by the Article 15 simple statement that “this Convention
does not prevent the recognition or enforcement of judgments under
national law.” I conclude by considering whether it would be practical to
add the Convention overlay of complexity brought about by Article 5(1) in
U.S. courts or to simply use the avenue provided by Article 15 when
foreign judgments are brought for recognition and enforcement should the

5

Judgments Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(1).

6

Id. art. 7.
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United States ratify and implement the Convention. This approach may
well mean that Article 5(1) – the central piece of the Convention’s
architecture – will have limited, if any, relevance in cases brought to
recognize and enforce a judgment in a Contracting State that, like the
United States, has no direct/indirect jurisdiction gap.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE HAGUE JUDGMENTS PROJECT
In May of 1992, the United States proposed that the Hague Conference
on Private International Law consider preparing a multilateral convention
on the recognition and enforcement of judgments.7 The matter was placed
on the agenda of the Hague Conference in October 1996,8 resulting in a
Preliminary Draft Convention text in October 1999.9 That text was revised
again at the first part of a split Diplomatic Conference in June 2001. While
a new text was created, closely following the 1999 Text, problems with
completion were clear from its many bracketed provisions, footnotes, and
explanations of various positions.10 In April 2002, the Conference
instructed an informal working group to consider drafting a more limited
convention, including only those jurisdictional provisions on which
substantial consensus existed. This resulted in a March 2003 Draft Text for
a Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.11 A further Special
7

Letter of May 5, 1992 from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Advisor, U.S.
Department of State, to Georges Droz, Secretary General, The Hague Conference
on Private International Law, distributed with Hague Conference document L.c.
ON No. 15 (92).
8

Final Act of the Eighteenth Session of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, 19 October 1996, at 21.
9

Informational note on the work of the informal meetings held since October
1999 to consider and develop drafts on outstanding items, drawn up by the
Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No.
15 (May 2001) (containing the text of the Preliminary Draft Convention).
10

Hague Conference on Private International Law, Commission II, Jurisdiction
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Summary of the
Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic
Conference 6 – 20 June 2001, Interim Text.
11

Preliminary Result of the Work of the Informal Working Group on the
Judgments Project, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No.
8 (Mar. 2003) (corrected) for the attention of the Special Commission of April
2003 on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference.
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Commission considered that text, and the Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements was concluded at a Diplomatic Conference in June of 2005.12
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements went into
effect for Mexico and the European Union (for 27 of its Member States) on
October 1, 2015;13 for Singapore on October 1, 2016; for Montenegro on
August 1, 2018, and for Denmark on September 1, 2018.14 The United
Kingdom has given notice that it remains in effect for the United Kingdom
subsequent to Brexit.15 The People’s Republic of China, the Republic of
North Macedonia, Ukraine, and the United States have signed, but have not
ratified, the Convention.16
The Choice of Court Convention contains three basic rules: Article 5
provides that a court chosen in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall
have exclusive jurisdiction; Article 6 provides that a court not chosen shall
defer to the chosen court; and Article 8 provides that the courts of all
contracting states shall recognize and enforce judgments from a court
chosen in an exclusive choice of court agreement, subject to an explicit list
of bases for non-recognition found in Article 9.17 Thus, the 2005
Convention is both a jurisdiction convention (limited to one basis of
jurisdiction: consent to exclusive dispute settlement in the courts of one
state) and a judgments convention (providing for circulation of judgments
from cases based on exclusive choice of court agreements).
12
The text of the Final Act of the Twentieth Session, and a documentary
history of the Choice of Court Convention project, are available on the Hague
Conference website at: http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&ci
d=98.
13
On 31 January 2020, the United Kingdom notified the Depositary that “the
United Kingdom and the European Union have signed, ratified and approved a
Withdrawal Agreement, which will enter into force on 1 February 2020 (the
“Withdrawal Agreement”). The Withdrawal Agreement includes provisions for a
transition period to start on the date the Withdrawal Agreement enters into force
and end on 31 December 2020 (the “transition period”). In accordance with the
Withdrawal Agreement, during the transition period, European Union law,
including the Agreement, will continue to be applicable to and in the United
Kingdom.
See
status
table
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98.
14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

For a more complete discussion of the Choice of Court Convention, see
BRAND AND HERRUP, supra note 2.
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In October 2011, the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the
Hague Conference established an Experts’ Group to consider the
resumption of the Judgments Project.18 There was a desire on the part of
some delegations to return to the original project and again draft a
convention that would deal with both direct jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments. In 2012, the Council split these two
objectives when it established a Working Group to prepare proposals for a
judgments convention and directed the Experts’ Group to give further study
to a separate jurisdiction convention.19 The Working Group completed a
Proposed Draft Text of a judgments convention in 2016, and the Council
established a Special Commission to move the text forward. The Experts’
Group was instructed to move forward on a jurisdiction convention only
after the judgments convention text would be concluded.20 Special
Commission meetings for a Judgments Convention were held on June 1-9,
2016; February 16-24, 2017; November 13-17, 2017; and May 24-29, 2018.
The Diplomatic Conference concluded on July 2, 2019, with the adoption
of the 2019 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters as its Final Text.21 Ukraine and
Uruguay have signed the Convention, but neither has yet ratified.22
III. THE 2019 JUDGMENTS CONVENTION
A. The Architecture of the Convention and the Rejected Alternative
The basic structure of the Judgments Convention text is rather simple,
but is then made more complex through the set of indirect jurisdiction
filters by which a court is to determine whether a judgment may circulate
under the Convention. Articles 1-3 set forth the scope of the Convention
and provide definitions.23 The Convention applies to “the recognition and
enforcement of judgments relating to civil or commercial matters,” subject

18

See https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Judgments Convention, supra note 1.

22

See https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=137.

23

Judgments Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1-3.
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to the exclusions from scope found in Article 2. The scope provisions
generally follow those in the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements, except that the Judgments Convention does not exclude
consumer matters from scope.
Article 4(1) provides the operative rule of the Convention, which
requires that each Contracting State shall recognize and enforce judgments
from other Contracting States and permits refusal only on those grounds
expressly set out in the Convention. The text reads as follows:
A judgment given by a court of a Contracting State (State of origin)
shall be recognised and enforced in another Contracting State
(requested State) in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
Recognition or enforcement may be refused only on the grounds
specified in this Convention.
Article 5 then determines which judgments are “eligible for recognition
and enforcement” under the Convention by providing a list of bases of
jurisdiction on which a judgment may have been founded. Thus, the court
addressed for purposes of recognition and enforcement indirectly considers
the basis of jurisdiction on which the court of origin directly founded its
judgment (or could have done so). Each item on the list is effectively
adopted as an indirect basis of jurisdiction for purposes of the Convention
text.24 If the facts before the court of origin could have satisfied any one of
the jurisdictional tests in the Article 5(1) list, then the judgment is
presumptively qualified for recognition and enforcement under the
Convention.
Not all of the tests in the Article 5(1) list may necessarily be described
as “bases of jurisdiction.” For example, the tests in subparagraphs 5(1)(a)
(court in the state of the defendant’s habitual residence), 5(1)(c) (party
which brought the principal claim), and 5(1)(e) (party consent), can be
described as simple fairness tests by which it can be determined that it is
appropriate for the courts of other states to give effect to the resulting
judgment. These tests may also be described as rules of comity based in
24

In the terminology thus used to describe the provisions of Article 5(1), a
“direct basis of jurisdiction” is a basis applied in the court of origin, in which the
original judgment is rendered. An “indirect basis of jurisdiction” is a basis used by
the court addressed when it is asked to grant recognition and enforcement. In this
way, bases of indirect jurisdiction are used by the court addressed to test the
jurisdiction of the court of origin in order to determine the qualification of the
judgment for recognition and enforcement in the court addressed. The recognizing
court indirectly applies these jurisdictional tests to consider the legitimacy of the
resulting judgment for purposes of circulation under the Convention.
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public international law considerations, namely: when should a public body
(a court) in one country not interfere with, and instead contribute to, making
effective, the relationship between a public act (a judgment of a court of
another country) and the parties affected by that act?
Article 6 departs from the basic character of the Convention by
inserting a single direct jurisdiction rule. It states that “[n]otwithstanding
Article 5, a judgment that ruled on rights in rem in immovable property
shall be recognised and enforced if and only if the property is situated in the
State of origin.” Thus, while the Convention otherwise deals with rules that
allow recognition and enforcement, Article 6 provides a rule that can
prohibit recognition and enforcement of a judgment that is not from the
State in which the immovable property is located.25 This is the only rule in
the Convention of this type.
Article 7 provides the general bases for non-recognition of a judgment,
even if that judgment meets the requirements of Article 5. This list tracks
closely the grounds for non-recognition found in the 2005 Hague Choice of
Court Convention,26 which grounds are generally familiar in national law
throughout the world and include such concerns as fraud, lack of proper
notice, the existence of inconsistent other judgments, and inconsistency
with the public policy of the recognizing state.27
Articles 8-15 provide additional rules governing specific circumstances
and procedures in an action for recognition and enforcement of a judgment.
Articles 16-23 are the “general clauses” for purposes of operation of the
Convention. Articles 24-32 are the “final clauses” dealing with ratification,
etc.
Articles 4-7 thus contain the basic rules by which judgments will be
tested for purposes of recognition and enforcement under the Convention.
Of these, if a judgment is within the scope of the Convention under Articles
1 and 2, Article 5(1) determines the judgments which are eligible for

25
Article 5(3) specifically prevents the use of the Article 5(1) bases of
jurisdiction in order to build circulation of a judgment falling within the ambit of
Article 6 (“Such a judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement only if it
was given by a court of the State where the property is situated.”).
26
27

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 4, art. 9.

The U.S. example can be found in Section 4(b) and (c) of the 2005 Uniform
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (2005 Recognition Act),
available
at
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?
DocumentFileKey=f6461fc7-183e-598b-d960-055343811a2f&forceDialog=0.
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recognition and Article 7 then sets out the bases on which recognition may
be denied. This makes Article 5(1) the door through which a judgment must
pass in order to be considered for recognition and enforcement under the
Convention.
The Convention text represents a very specific approach to convention
architecture by establishing the basic test for circulation of a foreign
judgment through a complex set of thirteen jurisdictional filters found in
Article 5(1). The building of the Convention text around that choice is
significant. An alternative approach to convention architecture, which
would have allowed the test for judgment circulation to be built on as few
as four rules, was considered and passed over in the earlier Working
Group.28 The first three rules in such an alternative would state simple
“fairness” tests, binding a judgment debtor to (1) decisions of the judgment
debtor’s home court; (2) decisions of the court in which the judgment
debtor initiated the action; and (3) decisions of a court to which the
judgment debtor expressly consented to jurisdiction. These three bases of
jurisdiction reflect the common elements of general jurisdiction throughout
the world as a result of the judgment debtor’s territorial home and party
consent. While the manner in defining the “home” of the
defendant/judgment debtor may differ in degree,29 they otherwise are for
the most part non-controversial in comparative jurisdictional jurisprudence.
They provide respect for jurisdiction based choices made by the party
against whom a judgment may be recognized and enforced; choices that
justify that party being bound by the decision of the court of origin for the
judgment.
The fourth rule in the alternative approach to convention architecture
would have replaced ten of the thirteen jurisdictional filters in Article 5(1)
28
29

The author was a member of the Working Group.

This is an area in which the U.S. Supreme Court has moved closer to the
European model in the past decade by limiting general jurisdiction over
corporations to cases brought in a state in which the defendant is not just engaged
in continuous and systematic activity, as was the former test, but cases in which “a
foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts . . . are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to
render [the corporation] essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 152 (2014). Justice Ginsburg’s opinion clearly reflected
and understanding of the general jurisdiction rule based on domicile found in
Article 5 of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation. Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (Brussels I (Recast) Regulation), [2012] O.J.E.U. L 351/1, 20 December
2012.
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with a single rule that would provide the indirect jurisdiction test for what is
commonly referred to as special or specific jurisdiction. Rather than
attempting to define all of the possible acceptable bases of indirect
jurisdiction for the life of the Convention, such a provision would state a
simple rule of non-discrimination. If the court addressed would have
allowed personal jurisdiction over the defendant on the facts existing in the
court of origin (i.e., if jurisdiction would have existed under direct
jurisdiction rules of the state of the court addressed based on the existing
facts as determined by the court of origin), then the court addressed must
acknowledge the legitimacy of the basis of jurisdiction in the court of origin
and allow the judgment to circulate, subject to the Convention’s standard
grounds for non-recognition.30 In other words, a Contracting State’s rules of
indirect jurisdiction, used to determine recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, would be the same as that State’s rules of direct
jurisdiction for determining whether to take a case as the originating court.
Each Contracting State would thus be compelled to acknowledge, as to its
partner Contracting States, that, if a rule of jurisdiction is found to be
acceptable at home, it must be found to be acceptable in other Contracting
States.
The Judgments Convention’s Article 5(1) list of jurisdictional filters
offers apparent advantages in that it provides an exhaustive list of available
indirect bases of jurisdiction, creates predictability in international litigation
by having the list available when a case is initiated, and conforms (in part)
to the predominant legal system model – continental European civil law.31
Nonetheless, it also carries with it several disadvantages.

30

This is what the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshf) did
when it applied § 323 of the German Civil Procedure Code (ZPO) to recognition of
a judgment from a U.S. Federal District Court in Wisconsin, when there otherwise
no connections between the defendant and Wisconsin, but the defendant had assets
in Illinois. This meant that jurisdiction based on any property of the defendant in
the forum state (here the entire United States) was consistent with German direct
jurisdiction law and was considered sufficient, even if a similar rule of jurisdiction
did not exist in the United States. BGHZ 141, 268, NJW 1999, 3198.
31
The core instrument in that system is the Brussels I Recast Regulation, supra
note 29.
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B. The Text of the Article 5(1) Threshold for Judgment Circulation
Because of its fundamental role in the Convention architecture, Article
5(1) is likely to be of central concern to any state’s determination of
whether to ratify the Convention. Thus, the advantages and disadvantages
of the Article 5(1) list of jurisdictional filters deserves careful
consideration. In some ways, this provision represents an effort to provide
the equivalent of a comprehensive domestic recognition and enforcement
statute in an international convention. This is similar to what occurred in
the original jurisdiction and judgments project and was found in the 1999
and 2001 texts. When that approach failed to generate a workable text,
negotiators sought a different approach, resulting in the 2005 Convention
on Choice of Court Agreements.
The problems in the 1999 and 2001 draft texts of a comprehensive
jurisdiction and judgments convention went far beyond over-drafting, and
largely existed because of bracketed text and footnotes indicating both
uncertainty and failure of substantive agreement (and, in fact, strong
disagreement over the policy and drafting of those provisions).32 The two
situations clearly have differences, and the Article 5(1) approach in the
Judgments Convention contributed to, rather than inhibited, the conclusion
of a final Convention text. Nonetheless, it is worth considering the role of
Article 5(1), both in the application of the Convention’s rules and in its
impact on national law upon possible ratification and implementation of the
Convention.
In order to consider carefully the impact of Article 5(1), it is necessary
to consider the length and complexity of its terms, which read as follows:
Article 5
Bases for recognition and enforcement
1. A judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if one of the
following requirements is met (a) the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought
was habitually resident in the State of origin at the time that
person became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin;

See Interim Text – Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in
Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference (6-22 June 2001),
prepared by the Permanent Bureau and the Co-reporters, available at
https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm2001draft_e.pdf.
32
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(b) the natural person against whom recognition or enforcement is
sought had their principal place of business in the State of
origin at the time that person became a party to the proceedings
in the court of origin and the claim on which the judgment is
based arose out of the activities of that business;
(c) the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought
is the person that brought the claim, other than a counterclaim,
on which the judgment is based;
(d) the defendant maintained a branch, agency, or other
establishment without separate legal personality in the State of
origin at the time that person became a party to the proceedings
in the court of origin, and the claim on which the judgment is
based arose out of the activities of that branch, agency, or
establishment;
(e) the defendant expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the
court of origin in the course of the proceedings in which the
judgment was given;
(f) the defendant argued on the merits before the court of origin
without contesting jurisdiction within the timeframe provided
in the law of the State of origin, unless it is evident that an
objection to jurisdiction or to the exercise of jurisdiction would
not have succeeded under that law;
(g) the judgment ruled on a contractual obligation and it was given
by a court of the State in which performance of that obligation
took place, or should have taken place, in accordance with
(i) the parties’ agreement, or
(ii) the law applicable to the contract, in the absence of an
agreed place of performance,
unless the activities of the defendant in relation to the
transaction clearly did not constitute a purposeful and
substantial connection to that State;
(h) the judgment ruled on a lease of immovable property (tenancy)
and it was given by a court of the State in which the property is
situated;
(i) the judgment ruled against the defendant on a contractual
obligation secured by a right in rem in immovable property
located in the State of origin, if the contractual claim was

RONALD A. BRAND
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brought together with a claim against the same defendant
relating to that right in rem;
(j) the judgment ruled on a non-contractual obligation arising from
death, physical injury, damage to or loss of tangible property,
and the act or omission directly causing such harm occurred in
the State of origin, irrespective of where that harm occurred;
(k) the judgment concerns the validity, construction, effects,
administration or variation of a trust created voluntarily and
evidenced in writing, and (i) at the time the proceedings were instituted, the State of
origin was designated in the trust instrument as a State in
the courts of which disputes about such matters are to be
determined; or
(ii) at the time the proceedings were instituted, the State of
origin was expressly or impliedly designated in the trust
instrument as the State in which the principal place of
administration of the trust is situated.
This sub-paragraph only applies to judgments regarding
internal aspects of a trust between persons who are or were
within the trust relationship;
(l) the judgment ruled on a counterclaim (i) to the extent that it was in favour of the counterclaimant,
provided that the counterclaim arose out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the claim; or
(ii) to the extent that it was against the counterclaimant, unless
the law of the State of origin required the counterclaim to
be filed in order to avoid preclusion;
(m) the judgment was given by a court designated in an agreement
concluded or documented in writing or by any other means of
communication which renders information accessible so as to
be usable for subsequent reference, other than an exclusive
choice of court agreement.
For the purposes of this sub-paragraph, an “exclusive choice of
court agreement” means an agreement concluded by two or
more parties that designates, for the purpose of deciding
disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a
particular legal relationship, the courts of one State or one or
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more specific courts of one State to the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of any other courts.33

C. A Text for the Rejected Alternative Approach to Article 5(1)
The alternative approach to Article 5(1), which was considered but not
followed in the Working Group,34 would have taken a more streamlined
approach. The following is an example of how such an alternative approach
might look (with the first three tests being quite similar to those found in
Article 5(1)(a), (c), and (e) of the Convention text):
Article 5
Bases for recognition and enforcement
1. A judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if one of the
following requirements is met a) the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought
was habitually resident in the State of origin at the time that
person became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin;
b) the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought
is the person that brought the claim on which the judgment is
based;

33
The remainder of Article 5 has relevance for consideration of paragraph (1),
and reads as follows:

2.

If recognition or enforcement is sought against a natural person acting
primarily for personal, family or household purposes (a consumer) in
matters relating to a consumer contract, or against an employee in
matters relating to the employee’s contract of employment (a) paragraph 1(e) applies only if the consent was addressed to the
court, orally or in writing;
(b) paragraph 1(f), (g) and (m) do not apply.

3.

34

Paragraph 1 does not apply to a judgment that ruled on a residential
lease of immovable property (tenancy) or ruled on the registration of
immovable property. Such a judgment is eligible for recognition and
enforcement only if it was given by a court of the State where the
property is situated.

See text following note 5, supra.
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c) the defendant expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the
court of origin either prior to or in the course of the
proceedings in which the judgment was given; or
d) the dispute in the State of origin was based on facts which
would have satisfied a basis of direct jurisdiction available in
the State addressed.
This approach would have provided for a much simpler Convention
architecture, and in that sense would have made the Convention similar to
the New York Arbitration Convention, which has been successful in part
because its simplicity has allowed both wide ratification and development
consistent with evolving needs.35
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE CHOICE FOR CONVENTION ARCHITECTURE
A. Advantages of the Judgments Convention Article 5(1) Text
At the outset, like any other legal text, Article 5(1) presents factors that
may be categorized as both advantages and disadvantages, depending on
the purpose one is seeking to achieve. Thus, some of the factors listed as
possible advantages in this section will also be discussed as possible
disadvantages in the following section.

1. A comprehensive and exhaustive set of bases of indirect
jurisdiction
Article 5(1) of the Judgments Convention represents an effort to be as
exhaustive as possible. Thus, in traditional civil law fashion, there was an
attempt to cover every possible acceptable direct jurisdiction basis as a rule
of indirect jurisdiction – i.e., as a jurisdictional filter. To the extent being
exhaustive is an advantage in a judgments convention, this is an advantage
of the Article 5(1) text. It leaves fewer possibilities for judicial
consideration outside the Convention’s application. By allowing the
35

United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, done at New York, 10 June 1958, 21 UST 2517, TIAS No. 6997,
330
UNTS
38
(“New
York
Convention”),
available
at
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/foreign_arbitral_awards.
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recognition and enforcement of judgments beyond those covered by the
Convention (except for judgments in violation of the direct jurisdiction rule
of Article 6), the Convention presents a floor for judgments recognition
purposes, and not a ceiling.36 Under Article 15, courts in Contracting States
may consider granting recognition and enforcement to judgments beyond
those which may be recognized and enforced under the Convention; they
simply would not do so by applying Convention rules.37 The Article 5(1)
list, however, by including thirteen jurisdictional tests, represents an effort
to set the floor high.

2. Predictability through clear statement
Also like civil law code-type legal instruments, Article 5(1) has been
drafted with an eye to predictability. There are clear advantages to having
the set of all possible indirect jurisdictional bases allowed under the
Convention expressly stated rather than acknowledged by implication, as is
otherwise possible. A lawyer bringing an action in a case that may require
recognition and enforcement in a state other than the state of the court of
origin will have a single list of indirect jurisdiction bases to consider. If one
of those bases is satisfied, then any resulting judgment is presumptively
eligible for recognition and enforcement in all Contracting States under the
Convention.
3. Adoption of the majority legal system model
The civil law model on which Article 5(1) is based is the predominant
model for judgments recognition law throughout the world. In the Hague
negotiations, the European Union was a leading advocate of this approach,
and proposed many of the provisions of Article 5(1), understandably
working to keep the set of jurisdictional filters consistent with current EU
law. Conformity with the predominant legal system model presents obvious
advantages for future Convention ratification and operation. Because many
non-European legal systems have developed from the continental civil law

Judgments Convention, supra note 1, art. 15 (“Subject to Article 6, this
Convention does not prevent the recognition or enforcement of judgments under
national law”).
36

37

Id.
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model, it is necessarily the approach more consistent with legal systems in
most Hague Member States. The Convention is more likely to be ratified by
the EU as a major player in the process, and thus more likely to draw
further adherents as a result of having an important lead ratification. As the
Brexit process also demonstrates, important common law states have
adopted many aspects of the Continental civil law model for jurisdictional
rules, thus making the draft text approach to presumptive circulation of a
judgment a natural one.

B. Disadvantages of the Judgments Convention Article 5(1) Text
Some of the disadvantages of the Judgments Convention architecture
arise from the same issues that create advantages. Others are separate and
distinct.

1. The risk of locked-in treaty text
The advantages of the exhaustive nature of Article 5(1) of the draft
Convention text also bring corresponding disadvantages. By attempting to
be exhaustive, the Article 5(1) text runs both the risk of not going far
enough, and the risk of going too far. The effort is exhaustive only with
respect to situations that have been confronted up to this point in time.
Given the dynamism of international trade – and the rapid process of
change in concepts of legal persons, methods of communication, and
technical means for the delivery of both content and services – it is not
difficult to imagine that other bases of jurisdiction may become widely
adopted, but remain outside the Convention. Nor is it difficult to imagine
that existing bases of jurisdiction may no longer fit advancing technological
methods. The Convention approach in Article 5(1) thus risks locking in
what may become outdated tests that can be changed only by treaty
amendment – a process which is extremely difficult, particularly if (as is
otherwise desirable) there becomes a large number of Contracting States.
2. The risk of “homeward trend” interpretation
The litigation predictability generated by an exhaustive list of
jurisdictional filters also has its downside. While the Article 5(1) list may
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present a lawyer considering the best forum in which to bring an
international case with the full set of indirect jurisdictional bases under the
Convention, it also brings with it greater opportunity for non-uniformity of
interpretation. Thus, while predictability is enhanced by having a fixed list,
it is also diminished by having an elaborate and complex set of “uniform”
rules which will be interpreted by multiple national courts. Each of those
courts, under Article 20 of the Convention, will have an obligation of
uniform interpretation.38 Nonetheless, because there is no single final court
to provide binding interpretation of the Convention text, the courts of every
Contracting State are likely to be subject to the “homeward trend” prevalent
in other conventions which purport to provide “uniform” rules.39
In the alternative, the narrowness of each jurisdictional filter may result
in net predictability about the application of each rule, but reduced coverage
of situations relevant to the evolving world of cross-border relationships.
The alternative approach suggested above would result in the test for
judgment circulation being determined by national courts based on their
own rules of direct jurisdiction. These may evolve pragmatically to take
account of new developments. Moreover, they would be interpreted and
applied by the courts of the state in which they exist, making non-uniform
interpretations of the Convention text less likely.

3. The risk of assuming effective legal system transfer
While the text of Article 5(1) may be predictable, and while such an
approach may work well in national or regional internal legislation such as
the Brussels I Regulation (where a single court will provide uniform
interpretation), using the same approach in a global convention that is not
easily subject to later amendment can be a source of potential problems.
While the EU has demonstrated that the Brussels I Regulation may be

Judgments Convention, supra note 1, art. 20 (“In the interpretation of this
Convention, regard shall be had to its international character and to the need to
promote uniformity in its application.”
38

The “homeward trend” in the interpretation of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), was first
noted by Professor John Honnold, and has been demonstrated through inconsistent
interpretations in Contracting States, with the development of regional versions of
the CISG as a result of judicial gloss. See, e.g., Harry M. Flechtner, Another CISG
Case in the U.S. Courts: Pitfalls for the Practitioner and the Potential for
Regionalized Interpretations, 15 J.L. & COM. 127 (1995).
39
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updated and revised, that is not so easily accomplished with a treaty
designed to be global and not just regional. The very specific nature of the
language of each entry in Article 5(1) may well lock in terminology that,
over the course of time, simply will not be capable of fair and reasonable
application. What is appropriate in the law of a single federal entity is not
necessarily appropriate in a global treaty.

4. The risk of favoring discriminatory jurisdictional schemes over
reciprocity
In the Explanatory Note setting the stage for Special Commission
consideration of the Judgments Convention draft text from the Working
Group, one of the stated goals of a judgments convention was listed as the
facilitation of international trade and investment by enhancing the free flow
of judgments.40 In other words, this is intended to be more than a private
international law convention; it is also intended to be a trade law
convention.
A fundamental rule found in just about every trade treaty is a rule of
non-discrimination.41 Contracting States take on reciprocal obligations in
order to create an international system that is fair and balanced. Article 5(1)
does not include a rule of non-discrimination. Rather, through the choice of
a specific set of rules of indirect jurisdiction, it allows those states that
discriminate in the process of judgments recognition to continue to do so.
40

See, e.g., Hague Conference on Private International Law, Judgments Prel.
Doc. No 2, Explanatory Note Providing Background on the Proposed Draft Text
and Identifying Outstanding Issues (April 2016) (“The Working Group proceeded
on the basis that the future Convention is intended to pursue two goals:
• to enhance access to justice;
• to facilitate cross-border trade and investment, by reducing costs and
risks associated with cross-border dealings.”)
41

See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III, opened for
signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5 & 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187,
reprinted in IV GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1-78
(1969), as amended by the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Done at Marrakech, Apr. 15, 1994. See also,
Ronald A. Brand, New Challenges in the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments, in THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ITS CHALLENGES (F. Ferrari & Diego P. Fernandez Arroyo eds., Edward Elgar
Publishing, forthcoming 2019).
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This results from the creation of a set of indirect jurisdiction rules which
may be more limited than a Contracting State’s corresponding set of direct
jurisdiction rules. This will allow Member States to continue to allow the
use of what are otherwise considered to be exorbitant bases of jurisdiction
against foreign defendants in their own courts while at the same time
refusing to recognize and enforce judgments brought on the same bases in
foreign courts.42
The discriminatory jurisdiction gap problem is not a minor one in the
global system for the recognition of judgments. A study done for the
Working Group in 2015 listed the following countries as using the same test
for direct jurisdiction as for indirect jurisdiction, and thus having no
jurisdiction gap:43
Albania
Argentina
Austria
Bulgaria
Canada

Chile
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland

Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Latvia

Luxembourg
Mexico
Slovakia
United States

The same study found a jurisdiction gap in which direct bases of
jurisdiction were more extensive than were indirect bases of jurisdiction in
the following countries:
Australia
Cyprus
Denmark
Egypt
Finland

Ghana
Iceland
Indonesia
Jordan
Kazakhstan

Kenya
Indonesia
New Zealand
Nigeria
Norway

Sweden
UAE
United
Kingdom

42
Such a discriminatory approach is clearly rejected in the internal EU system
for recognition and enforcement of judgments through the operation of Article 5 of
the Brussels I Recast Regulation, which allows defendants domiciled in Member
States to be sued in other Member States only if one of the bases of jurisdiction
listed in Sections 2 through 7 of the Regulation exists. With the resulting exclusive
list of direct bases of jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement under Article 36
then occurs without consideration of jurisdiction in the court of origin, thus making
the bases for direct and indirect jurisdiction exactly the same under the Regulation.
Brussels I Recast Regulation, supra note 29.
43

Comparative Study of Jurisdictional Gaps and Their Effect on the
Judgments Project, memo of July 1, 2015 to Permanent Bureau of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, prepared by Mr Charles Kotuby, partner
at the law firm Jones Day, Washington, DC. See also, Comparative Table on
Grounds of Jurisdiction Prepared by the Permanent Bureau, January 2015.

RONALD A. BRAND

23

The absence of a jurisdiction gap can be demonstrated by the judgments
recognition systems in the United States, Germany, and Italy. In the United
States, the general rule for recognition of judgments is found most often in
state law in the form of a uniform act.44 The 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country
Money Judgments Recognition Act,45 provides that a foreign money
judgment which is final and enforceable in the country in which it is
rendered, shall be recognized and enforced,46 subject to a limited list of
grounds for non-recognition.47 One of the mandatory grounds for nonrecognition is that “the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.”48 U.S. courts have uniformly interpreted this provision of
the Uniform Act (and of the common law test without the Uniform Act) to
mean the foreign court must have had jurisdiction according to U.S. tests of
personal jurisdiction.49 This means that, if the facts before the foreign court
would have satisfied the tests a U.S. court applies in determining direct
jurisdiction, then the U.S. court addressed for purposes of recognition and
enforcement will accept that judgment, subject to specific listed grounds for
non-recognition. There is no difference between the test for direct
jurisdiction and the test for indirect jurisdiction.
The same is true in German courts faced with a request for recognition
and enforcement of a judgment from outside the European Union.50 Section
44

For more complete information on the U.S. system for the recognition of
foreign judgments, see Ronald A. Brand, Federal Judicial Center International
Litigation Guide: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 74 U. PITT.
L.
REV.
491
(2013),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443977.
45

2005 Recognition Act, supra note 27.

46

Id. art. 4(a).

47

Id. art. 4(b) and (c).

48

Id. art. 4(b)(2).

“The prevailing view is that, even if the rendering court had jurisdiction
under the laws of its own state, a court in the United States asked to recognize a
foreign judgment should scrutinize the basis for asserting jurisdiction in the light of
American concepts of jurisdiction to adjudicate. International Shoe and its progeny
govern this determination.” Ronald A. Brand, International Business Transactions
Fundamentals, ch. 6 (2d ed. 2018). See, e.g., Mercandino v. Devoe & Raynolds,
Inc., 181 N.J. Super. 105, 108, 436 A.2d 942 (App. Div. 1981) (“In determining
whether the Italian court had jurisdiction we deem it appropriate to apply the
minimum contacts test.”).
49

50
Judgments from within the EU are governed by the Brussels I Recast
Regulation. Brussels I Recast Regulation, supra note 9.
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328(I) of the German Code of Civil Procedure includes a requirement that
the foreign court from which a judgment originates had “jurisdiction under
German law.”51 In Italy, Article 64 of Law 218/1995 is similar on this issue,
requiring that, for recognition of a foreign judgment to occur, “the authority
rendering the judgement had jurisdiction pursuant to the criteria of
jurisdiction in force under Italian law.”52 In each of these instances, the
rules of direct jurisdiction are applied as the rules of indirect jurisdiction.
This means that, so long as the case could have been brought in the
recognizing state on similar jurisdictional facts, the court addressed will
accept that jurisdiction was proper in the court of origin.
This is not the case in those countries which have a broader list for
direct jurisdiction than for indirect jurisdiction purposes. An example of
such a discriminatory jurisdiction gap is found in the United Kingdom.
There, the direct jurisdiction rules are found in Practice Direction 6B which
accompanies Part 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 of the Supreme
Court of England and Wales (CPR). The Practice Direction provides a court
with discretion to order service outside the jurisdiction of the United
Kingdom by listing twenty-one connecting factors, each of which may
justify service outside the jurisdiction and thus constitutes an acceptable
basis
of
jurisdiction
over
a
foreign
defendant.53

51

See, I Philip Weems, Enforcement of Money Judgments Abroad FRG-29
(1993).
52

Article 64(1)(a) of Law 218/1995, Italy.

53

Practice Direction 6B:
Service out of the jurisdiction where permission is required
3.1 The claimant may serve a claim form out of the jurisdiction with the
permission of the court under rule 6.36 where –
General Grounds
(1) A claim is made for a remedy against a person domiciled within the
jurisdiction.
(2) A claim is made for an injunction(GL) ordering the defendant to do
or refrain from doing an act within the jurisdiction.
(3) A claim is made against a person (‘the defendant’) on whom the
claim form has been or will be served (otherwise than in reliance on
this paragraph) and –
(a) there is between the claimant and the defendant a real issue
which it is reasonable for the court to try; and
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(b) the claimant wishes to serve the claim form on another person
who is a necessary or proper party to that claim.
(4) A claim is an additional claim under Part 20 and the person to be
served is a necessary or proper party to the claim or additional claim.
(4A) A claim is made against the defendant in reliance on one or more of
paragraphs (2), (6) to (16), (19) or (21) and a further claim is made
against the same defendant which arises out of the same or closely
connected facts.
Claims for interim remedies
(5) A claim is made for an interim remedy under section 25(1) of the
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982.
Claims in relation to contracts
(6) A claim is made in respect of a contract where the contract –
(a) was made within the jurisdiction;
(b) was made by or through an agent trading or residing within the
jurisdiction;
(c) is governed by English law; or
(d) contains a term to the effect that the court shall have jurisdiction
to determine any claim in respect of the contract.
(7) A claim is made in respect of a breach of contract committed within
the jurisdiction.
(8) A claim is made for a declaration that no contract exists where, if the
contract was found to exist, it would comply with the conditions set
out in paragraph (6).
Claims in tort
(9) A claim is made in tort where –
(a) damage was sustained, or will be sustained, within the
jurisdiction; or
(b) damage which has been or will be sustained results from an act
committed, or likely to be committed, within the jurisdiction.
Enforcement
(10) A claim is made to enforce any judgment or arbitral award.
Claims about property within the jurisdiction
(11) The subject matter of the claim relates wholly or principally to
property within the jurisdiction, provided that nothing under this
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paragraph shall render justiciable the title to or the right to
possession of immovable property outside England and Wales.
Claims about trusts etc.
(12) A claim is made in respect of a trust which is created by the
operation of a statute, or by a written instrument, or created orally
and evidenced in writing, and which is governed by the law of
England and Wales.
(12A) A claim is made in respect of a trust which is created by the
operation of a statute, or by a written instrument, or created orally
and evidenced in writing, and which provides that jurisdiction in
respect of such a claim shall be conferred upon the courts of England
and Wales.
(13) A claim is made for any remedy which might be obtained in
proceedings for the administration of the estate of a person who died
domiciled within the jurisdiction or whose estate includes assets
within the jurisdiction.
(14) A probate claim or a claim for the rectification of a will.
(15) A claim is made against the defendant as constructive trustee, or as
trustee of a resulting trust, where the claim arises out of acts
committed or events occurring within the jurisdiction or relates to
assets within the jurisdiction.
(16) A claim is made for restitution where –
(a) the defendant’s alleged liability arises out of acts committed
within the jurisdiction; or
(b) the enrichment is obtained within the jurisdiction; or
(c) the claim is governed by the law of England and Wales.
Claims by HM Revenue and Customs
(17) A claim is made by the Commissioners for H.M. Revenue and
Customs relating to duties or taxes against a defendant not domiciled
in Scotland or Northern Ireland.
Claim for costs order in favour of or against third parties
(18) A claim is made by a party to proceedings for an order that the court
exercise its power under section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 to
make a costs order in favour of or against a person who is not a party
to those proceedings.
(Rule 46.2 sets out the procedure where the court is considering
whether to exercise its discretion to make a costs order in favour of
or against a non-party.)
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Admiralty claims
(19) A claim is –
(a) in the nature of salvage and any part of the services took place
within the jurisdiction; or
(b) to enforce a claim under section 153, 154,175 or 176A of the
Merchant Shipping Act 1995.
Claims under various enactments
(20) A claim is made –
(a) under an enactment which allows proceedings to be brought and
those proceedings are not covered by any of the other grounds
referred to in this paragraph; or
(b) under the Directive of the Council of the European Communities
dated 15 March 1976 No. 76/308/EEC, where service is to be
effected in a Member State of the European Union.
Claims for breach of confidence or misuse of private information
(21) A claim is made for breach of confidence or misuse of private
information where
(a) detriment was suffered, or will be suffered, within the
jurisdiction; or
(b) detriment which has been, or will be, suffered results from an act
committed, or likely to be committed, within the jurisdiction.

The Practice Direction thus provides a set of “gateways” to jurisdiction
in UK courts. The list of jurisdictional grounds is tempered by Paragraph
6.37, which adds a form conveniens element by granting the court
discretion and limiting jurisdiction based on any of the grounds to those
cases in which the court is “satisfied that England and Wales is the proper
place in which to bring the claim.”54
When a judgment is brought from a foreign court for recognition and
enforcement and a UK court indirectly tests the jurisdiction of a foreign
court, it will apply “The Dicey Rule,” found in the most recent edition of
Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws.55 That test provides for only four
grounds of indirect jurisdiction.56 The result could be interpreted either as

54

Id.
Application for permission to serve the claim form out of the jurisdiction.
6.37
(1) An application for permission under rule 6.36 must set out (a) which ground in paragraph 3.1 of Practice Direction 6B is relied
on;
(b) that the claimant believes that the claim has a reasonable prospect
of success; and
(c) the defendant’s address or, if not known, in what place the
defendant is, or is likely, to be found.
(2) Where the application is made in respect of a claim referred to in
paragraph 3.1(3) of Practice Direction 6B, the application must also
state the grounds on which the claimant believes that there is between
the claimant and the defendant a real issue which it is reasonable for
the court to try.
(3) The court will not give permission unless satisfied that England and
Wales is the proper place in which to bring the claim.

55

DICEY & MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, Rule 43 (14R-054) (15th ed.
2012). See, e.g., Rubin v. Eurofinance SA, [2012] UKSC 46, at ¶¶ 7-10, in which
Lord Collins, the General Editor of DICEY & MORRIS, follows the “Dicey Test,”
and traces its history.
56

DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 45, Rule 43:
Rule 43 – Subject to Rules 44 to 46, a court of a foreign country outside
the United Kingdom has jurisdiction to give a judgment in personam
capable of enforcement or recognition as against the person against whom
it was given in the following cases:
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acknowledgment that the longer list of direct bases of jurisdiction found in
Practice Direction 6B contains otherwise questionable bases of jurisdiction,
or that there is a desire to discriminate against judgments from foreign
courts.57
The alternative approach to Article 5(1) suggested above would
effectively prevent a jurisdiction gap in the operation of the Convention by
making the grounds for indirect jurisdiction in each Contracting State
exactly the same as that state’s grounds for direct jurisdiction – for
judgments coming from courts of other Contracting States. This would
mean that the rules for recognition and enforcement in each Contracting
State could differ for purposes of Article 5(1) from those in other
Contracting States, but they would be consistent with each State’s rules for
direct jurisdiction. Parties to litigation in which recognition and
enforcement may be required in other Contracting States would logically
begin by looking at the first three bases for judgment circulation in the
alternative list. This alone would create some channeling of litigation into
those three more favored approaches to jurisdiction. Beyond that, parties to
international litigation would then consider the grounds for direct

First Case – If the person against whom the judgment was given was, at
the time the proceedings were instituted, present in the foreign country.
Second Case – If the person against whom the judgment was given was
claimant, or counterclaimed, in the proceedings in the foreign court.
Third Case – If the person against whom the judgment was given,
submitted to the jurisdiction of that court by voluntarily appearing in the
proceedings.
Fourth Case – If the person against whom the judgment was given, had
before the commencement of the proceedings agreed, in respect of the
subject matter of the proceedings, to submit to the jurisdiction of that
court or of the courts of that country.
See, Ardavan Arzandeh, “Gateways” within the Civil Procedure Rules and
the future of service-out jurisdiction in England, 15 J. PRIV. INTL. L. 516 (2019)
(suggesting that the direct jurisdiction gateways of Practice Direction 6B have
become superfluous and should be abandoned); and Ardavan Arzandeh,
Reformulating the common law rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, 39 LEGAL STUDIES 56 (2017) (recommending that the full list of
gateway direct jurisdiction bases found in Practice Direction 6B should be applied
for indirect jurisdiction purposes in testing foreign judgments for purposes of
recognition and enforcement).
57
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jurisdiction in the state or states in which recognition or enforcement may
be required. This step is no different from what is currently necessary when
recognition and enforcement may be required in a country in which there is
no jurisdiction gap.
Whether one is concerned with simple fairness and preventing
discrimination, or with the normal process of reciprocity common to
international trade treaties, the fact that Article 5(1) of the Judgments
Convention locks in discriminatory jurisdiction gaps in the states in which
they currently exist should be a matter of concern in the international
litigation process.

5. The risk of a diminished channeling function
The other goal of a Judgments Convention which was noted in the
Permanent Bureau Report to the first Special Commission is the possibility
of improving the litigation landscape through “access to justice” for parties
considering or involved in cross-border litigation.58 Access to justice is a
judgments recognition issue, but it is first a direct jurisdiction issue. This
raises the question of how a judgments convention might impact questions
of direct jurisdiction.
Other than the Article 6 incorporation of exclusive jurisdiction status
for cases involving rights in rem in immovable property, and its use to
provide grounds for prohibition of recognition even outside the Convention,
the Judgments Convention does not explicitly affect rules of direct
jurisdiction. A functioning Judgments Convention can, however, have an
impact on national rules of direct jurisdiction through a channeling effect
which may occur even in the absence of a separate jurisdiction convention.
Litigators bringing claims that may require judgment recognition in a
country other than that of the court of origin will necessarily consider the
bases of direct jurisdiction which can result in circulation of their judgment
under a Convention (i.e., when that direct jurisdiction choice becomes a
matter of indirect jurisdiction analysis). Their litigation conduct should
logically be channeled into the most widely accepted bases of jurisdiction.

58

Prel. Doc. No 2, supra note 40.
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With the Judgments Convention built on rules of indirect jurisdiction,
those rules should also be considered by litigators at the outset, and should
channel cases into courts in which acceptable bases of jurisdiction exist for
both direct and indirect jurisdiction purposes. A list of thirteen indirect
jurisdiction bases in Article 5(1) limits the possibilities of achieving this
channeling function. The list does encourage bringing cases which satisfy
one of the jurisdictional bases on the list. As noted earlier, however, it also
sets up rather complex rules that may result in different interpretations of
those jurisdictional bases in the courts of different Contracting States – thus
limiting predictability and risking non-recognition even though the court of
origin finds the jurisdictional basis to exist.
An alternative based on a simple non-discrimination rule would have
encouraged cases to be brought based on the direct jurisdiction rules most
common to countries in which recognition and enforcement might be
sought. Over time, this might have caused Contracting States to reassess
their bases of direct jurisdiction, and thus might also have served to provide
a channeling effect resulting in the reduction of the number of exorbitant
bases of jurisdiction existing in those states. This might have been only an
indirect way of achieving what could otherwise be done by a jurisdiction
convention, but, given the problems which prevented coalescence on rules
of direct jurisdiction in the Hague 1999 and 2001 drafts of a comprehensive
jurisdiction and judgments convention (which problems largely remain
today), it might have been a more palatable and effective way of achieving
that result.

C. Comparing the Alternatives
The advantages of the approach found in Article 5(1) of the Judgment
Convention may be summarized as follows:
1) it provides an exhaustive list of available indirect bases of
jurisdiction;
2) it creates predictability in international litigation by having the list
available when a case is initiated; and
3) it conforms to the predominant legal system model - that of the
continental European civil law legal system.
In comparison, the alternative approach suggested above would
diminish or eliminate:
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1) the risk of an exhaustive list which locks in what may become
outdated tests that can be changed only by difficult treaty
amendment;
2) the risk of diminishing predictability through national court
interpretation and the attendant “homeward trend” that has been
evident in similar conventions which provide “uniform” rules;
3) the risk of assuming that effective national or regional legal
frameworks can automatically be implemented on a global basis;
4) the risk of retention and endorsement of discriminatory
jurisdictional schemes applied to judgments recognition rules (thus
providing consistency with normal international trade treaty
concepts of reciprocity); and
5) the risk of a diminished channeling function that might otherwise
be achieved under a system that encourages uniformity of direct
and indirect bases of jurisdiction.
Consistently more rapid technological developments have a significant
impact on both what is exchanged across borders and the manner in which
those exchanges occur. Such developments also have an impact on legal
rules dealing with disputes which arise from those exchanges. Today, we
are faced more-and-more with a borderless world for international trade,
but have jurisdictional rules that necessarily require reference to territorial
concepts. While people and goods could easily be identified to exist within
the physical borders of states in the nineteenth century, developments in
legal personality, intellectual property rights, electronic transmission of
data, financial services, and other elements of international trade, cause
both legal persons, and relevant legal concepts and rights, to exist in many
places (and many states) at once, without clear practical deference to state
authority defined by lines drawn on maps.
Jurisdictional rules based on the place of performance of a contract or
the place of injury resulting from a tort now often require the reification of
concepts in order to treat them as if they are things that exist within
physical borders. In other words, they require reference to legal fictions.
This may simply be a matter of necessity, but, it is important that we not
have nineteenth century law for solving twenty-first century problems.
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V. WHY THE ARTICLE 5(1) CONVENTION ARCHITECTURE MATTERS:
THE LIKELY USE OF ARTICLE 15 TO AVOID THE ARTICLE 5(1)
CONVENTION FRAMEWORK IN STATES WITH NO JURISDICTION GAP
It may be that the solution to the problems discussed above is in the
Convention itself. Article 15 is, at first glance, a simple provision of limited
consequence. It provides:
Subject to Article 6, this Convention does not prevent the
recognition or enforcement of judgments under national law.
Article 15 makes the Convention obligations a floor and not a ceiling.
Contracting States must recognize and enforce judgments when they meet
the requirements of the other provisions of the Convention. Under Article
15, however, Contracting States are not prohibited from recognizing and
enforcing judgments that would not be required to be recognized and
enforced under the Convention (they are, in fact, encouraged to do so). This
may include judgments outside the scope of the Convention (e.g.,
judgments in cases involving intellectual property rights) or judgments
within the scope of the convention but not based on grounds of jurisdiction
otherwise excluded from Article 5(1).
It may be that Article 15 will be a much more consequential provision
of the Convention than many have contemplated. This is particularly the
case in regard to two matters, the second of which is discussed below with
specific reference to potential ratification and implementation in the United
States.

A. Article 15 Differences in States With No Jurisdiction Gap
It might appear at first glance that some of the problems related to the
Article 5(1) architecture of the Convention will be reduced through the
operation of Article 15. As already noted, Article 15 allows Contracting
States to continue to apply rules on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments which are more liberal than those in the Convention text.
This is a positive function, but it has positive effect only if national law
actually allows recognition and enforcement beyond what is achieved
through other Convention rules.
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Those Contracting States without a jurisdiction gap – in which
judgments that fall outside of the Article 5(1) gateway to judgment
circulation could be recognized and enforced as consistent with the direct
jurisdiction rules in the state addressed – will continue to give effect to
foreign judgments from other Contracting States. Thus, recognition and
enforcement beyond Convention requirements will be achieved through the
use of Article 15.
Contracting States with a significant jurisdiction gap, on the other hand,
are less likely to be able to use the Article 15 to recognize and enforce
judgments outside the Convention framework, simply because national law
is unlikely to allow broader circulation of judgments than does the
Convention. The list of thirteen jurisdictional filters in Article 5(1) is more
likely in these states to already include the bases of indirect jurisdiction on
which recognition and enforcement is allowed under national law – in fact,
the Convention should enhance recognition and enforcement in such states,
which is its very purpose. The basic reciprocity expected of treaty
relationships will likely be frustrated in those states with such jurisdiction
gaps that remain after ratification and implementation of the Convention.

B. Convention Operation in States With No Jurisdiction Gap: Lessons
for U.S. Ratification and Implementation
1. Using Article 15 to avoid the transaction costs of Article 5(1)
If ratified and implemented by the United States, the Convention will
have two principal roles for U.S. litigants: (1) providing rules for the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments from other Contracting
States in U.S. courts, and (2) providing rules for the recognition and
enforcement of U.S. judgments in the courts of other Contracting States.
U.S. lawyers will be most involved in the first. They should, however, be
most concerned about the second when bringing actions in U.S. courts for
which recognition and enforcement might be required abroad.
It is wholly possible that Article 5(1) of the Convention will have little,
if any, role when a foreign judgment is brought to the United States for
recognition and enforcement. This may be true as well in other Contracting
States that have no direct/indirect jurisdiction gap. Because of the complex
nature of the thirteen indirect bases of jurisdiction stated in Article 5(1), it
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will simply make no sense in U.S. litigation to waste the time of counsel
and courts trying to understand and apply those provisions when Article 15
provides a fast track to recognition and enforcement. All a litigant and a
court need to know is current U.S. (often state) law on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. Because that law operates without a
jurisdiction gap, it will naturally be more liberal for purposes of recognition
and enforcement (one need not compare the Article 5(1) indirect
jurisdiction rules with national rules that would otherwise apply in the
absence of the Convention). Pre-existing law on judgments recognition will
also be more easily understood by lawyers and judges accustomed to U.S.
rules of direct jurisdiction, which serve similarly as the rules of indirect
jurisdiction. Thus, it will save judicial time and expense simply to apply
existing rules and use Article 15 to fit within the Convention structure. If
the recognition and enforcement of a judgment can be achieved under
Article 15, there simply is no need to deal with the complexities of Article
5(1), and no need to risk the accompanying problems of non-uniform
interpretation as compared to decisions of courts in other Contracting
States.

2. Using Article 15 to avoid burden of proof uncertainties
There would be other benefits as well to recognizing foreign judgments
in U.S. courts through the function of Article 15 rather than engaging in the
more complex Article 5(1) analysis. Neither the Convention nor the
Explanatory Report provides a clear statement regarding the manner in
which a court will receive information on whether a foreign judgment does
or does not meet one of the thirteen Article 5(1) gateway requirements to
circulation under the Convention. In existing U.S. law, the indirect
jurisdiction test is not a gateway requirement to circulation; it is a ground
for non-recognition. There is an important distinction implied here in
burden of proof. When the requirement is a ground for non-recognition,
then the judgment debtor generally has the burden of proving the ground in
order to achieve non-recognition. This is the position taken in the 2005
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act § 4(d).59
When the indirect jurisdiction requirement is a basis for circulation (a
gateway function), the clear implication is that the judgment creditor has
59

2005 Recognition Act, supra note 27, § 4(d).
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the burden of proving that the requirement has been met. This, again, makes
the Convention architecture much more restrictive (and difficult, and
expensive) for a judgment creditor, and counsels in favor of a party seeking
recognition in a U.S. court directly under Article 15, thus bypassing the
Convention architecture entirely.

3. Using Article 15 to avoid the limitations of Article 5(2)
Article 5(2) is designed to coordinate with rules found in EU law that
are intended to protect consumers and employees as weaker parties. Both
the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation and the Rome I Regulation have
provisions designed to use rules of private international law to protect
weaker parties.60 Thus, Article 5(2) operates to prevent the circulation of
judgments against consumers and employees in situations in which the EU
instruments create an irrebuttable presumption that the consumer or
employee is the weaker party and should not be allowed to exercise party
autonomy on choice of forum or choice of law.
Article 5(2) operates only to limit recognition and enforcement under
the Convention, and does not otherwise change the national law of a
Contracting State. Thus, where Article 15 allows broader recognition and
enforcement under national law, the effect of Article 5(2) is also reduced.
The “ceiling-not-a-floor” effect of the Convention allows national law to
operate free of the limitations of Article 5(2). Whether such cases will
present an issue in the operation of the Convention may be only an
academic question, but the possibility of broader recognition than is
allowed under Article 5 is real and provides one more opportunity to avoid
the complexities of the Convention architecture through the operation of
Article 15.

60

For more detailed discussion of the use of private international law for
purposes of consumer protection, and a comparison of EU and U.S. approaches, see
Ronald A. Brand, The Unfriendly Intrusion of Consumer Legislation into Freedom
to Contract for Effective ODR, LIBER AMICORUM JOHAN ERAUW 365-380 (Maud
Piers, Henri Storm, Jinske Verhellen, eds., Intersentia 2014), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520035.
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CONCLUSION

For States like the United States, that do not have a direct/indirect
jurisdiction gap in their national law, the 2019 Judgments Convention may
not change the game so much as simply shuffle the framework in which the
existing rules are applied. Compared to existing U.S. law on the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgements, Article 5(1) of the Convention
presents a more complex initial inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court of
origin, as well as the possibility of non-uniform interpretation of
Convention provisions. These problems may be avoided, however, by using
Article 15 to divert decisions to national law.
The advantages of the Convention architecture reflected in Article 5(1)
are that it provides a comprehensive and exhaustive set of bases of indirect
jurisdiction, predictability through a single list of those bases of
jurisdiction, and familiarity by being similar to the major civil law legal
systems of the world. In the process, however, this structure creates
significant risks, including:
1) the risk of an exhaustive list which locks in what may become
outdated tests that can be changed only by difficult treaty
amendment;
2) the risk of diminishing predictability through national court
interpretation and the attendant “homeward trend” that has been
evident in similar conventions which provide “uniform” rules;
3) the risk of assuming that effective national or regional legal
frameworks can automatically be implemented on a global scale;
4) the risk of retention and endorsement of discriminatory
jurisdictional schemes applied to judgments recognition rules, thus
avoiding normal international trade treaty concepts of reciprocity:
and
5) the risk of a diminished channeling function that might otherwise
be achieved under a system that encourages uniformity of direct
and indirect bases of jurisdiction; i.e., the Convention will not
encourage either private parties to alter their litigation conduct or
States to reconsider the continuation of exorbitant bases of direct
jurisdiction.
Despite these problems with Convention architecture, ratification and
implementation of the Convention in states, like the United States, that have
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no direct/indirect jurisdiction gap may still be worthwhile. The benefits of
enhanced recognition and enforcement of home country judgments abroad
may well make it useful to implement the Convention and use Article 15 to
continue to apply national law to judgments recognition in domestic courts.
This would approach the alternative architecture that could have been used,
and thus reduce both transaction costs and the likelihood of inconsistent
interpretation of the provisions of Article 5(1).
While the normal reciprocity effects of any private international law
treaty should operate to reduce transaction costs, there are serious questions
about whether the Judgments Convention will have that effect for foreign
judgments brought for recognition and enforcement in the United States. It
is much more likely that the transaction costs of other Convention rules,
and in particular Article 5(1), will counsel avoidance of Article 5(1)
entirely, through the path provided by Article 15.

